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Summary 
This report provides an overview of the status of employee wages and benefits, 
including retiree benefits, when an employer files in bankruptcy, and the amendments 
made to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act. Private pensions, regulated by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, are generally protected, although defined benefit pension plan 
payments may be substantially reduced. Health and life insurance benefits, which 
are not required by federal law, are vulnerable to an employer's bankruptcy-driven 
modification or termination. This report examines those provisions in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code which govern the priority of employee wage and benefit claims, 
including severance payments; procedures for a chapter 1 1 debtor to modify benefits 
under a collective bargaining agreement; and procedures for a chapter 11 debtor to 
modify retiree life and health insurance benefits. It examines the role of employees 
on creditor committees and procedures in bankruptcy that facilitate lawsuits that may 
be directed at an employerldebtor. Finally, it considers the treatment accorded some 
aspects of managerial compensation, such as retention bonuses. 
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Employment-Related Issues in Bankruptcy 
This report provides an overview of employment related issues when a business 
files in bankruptcy under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 1 1 U.S.C. 3 101 et seq., as 
amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA).' A business employer will generally file under one of two of the 
operative chapters of the Code. It may seek to cease operation and liquidate under 
chapter 7, or to continue in business and reorganize under chapter 1 1. The status of 
basic benefits, such as wages, pensions, and health care for active and retired 
employees, which have to date been the subject of greatest concern to employees of 
a company in bankruptcy. are examined. 
The behavior and compensation of a debtor's executives have become more 
controversial in recent years, corresponding to many high-profile bankruptcies, for 
example, those of Enron and Worldcom, that were caused, in part if not solely, by 
managerial malfeasance as opposed to external economic factors. This report 
considers compensation of debtor's management as well. 
Employee Benefits 
Many employees, especially retirees, fear loss of all employment benefits upon 
learning that their employer has filed in bankruptcy. Fortunately, this is not 
necessarily the case, although some benefits may be subject to modification or 
termination. It is important to know that employee benefits, including retiree 
benefits, have no universal legal referent; they may be covered by a wide variety of 
federal and state laws. More important though is the fact that specific employee 
welfare benefit plans are governed by contract terms which vary from plan to plan. 
And, each bankruptcy - and the consequences for each of the debtor's creditors, 
including its employees - is highly case specific. Unique to bankruptcy, however, 
is the demarcation between prepetition (pre-filing) and postpetition (post-filing) 
claims. Because the entire bankruptcy process is concerned with debt forgiveness of 
pre-bankruptcy indebtedness, the classification of a claim as pre- or postpetition is 
of great consequence. Determining whether a claim accrues pre- or postpetition is 
not always clear cut. 
Active employees of an employer in a chapter 11 reorganization. 
Typically, a chapter 1 1 debtor will get an order from the bankruptcy court permitting 
it to continue business and to compensate its employees just as it had prior to filing. 
Postpetition operating expenses are considered to be high priority administrative 
expenses, i.e., "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, 
including wages, salaries, and commissions for services rendered after the 
' P.L. 109-8 (2005). 
commencement of the case."' Thus, in many instances, employees of a chapter 11 
debtor will realize no change in the terms and conditions of their employment. The 
BAPCPA amended the Code to also include back pay (i.e., prepetition wages) due 
to employees as a consequence of illegal behavior by the debtor as an administrative 
expense. The bankruptcy court must determine that the inclusion of back pay will 
not substantially increase the probability of layoff or termination of current 
employees.3 
In traditional employment-at-will situations, a debtorlemployer may lay off 
employees or attempt to renegotiate the terms of employment, just as the employee 
is free to accept a different compensation structure or terminate the employment 
relationship. These contingencies may occur in connection with the 
debtorlemployer's bankruptcy. But there are special requirements for a chapter 11 
debtor seeking to renegotiate collective bargaining agreements with union employees. 
Rejection of collective bargaining agreements. In 1984, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) could be rejected, 
i.e., terminated, by a d e b t ~ r . ~  In response to the Court's interpretation, Congress 
enacted a statute which prescribes the procedures that a debtor in chapter 11 must 
take before it may alter the terms of or terminate a collective bargaining agreement.5 
After a petition is filed, if the debtor wishes to alter or terminate the collective 
bargaining agreement, it must supply the authorized representative of the employees 
complete and reliable information to demonstrate the need, in order to facilitate a 
reorganization, for the modifications to the employees' benefits and protections. The 
employees and debtor are required to engage in "good faith" negotiations with 
respect to proposals for alteration or termination of such agreements. 
If the debtor files an application to reject a CBA, the court is directed to 
schedule a hearing for not later than fourteen days after the filing. All interested 
parties may attend and participate in the hearing and the court should rule on the 
application within thirty days after the beginning of the hearing. 
The court may approve the application for rejection only if it finds (i) that the 
debtor, prior to the hearing, provided the authorized representative of the employees 
with the necessary information; (ii) the authorized representative has refused to 
accept the proposal without good cause; and, (iii) the balance of the equities clearly 
favors rejection. 
11 U.S.C. 5 503(b). 
I d .  at 5 503(b)(l)(ii). 
National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), holding that 
collective bargaining agreements are "executory contracts" under 1 1 U.S.C. 9 365 and may 
be rejected by a debtor unilaterally if the debtor can show that the agreement burdens the 
estate and that the equities balance in favor of rejection. 
11 U.S.C. 5 11 13. 
In addition the court may, after a hearing, authorize interim changes in the 
terms, conditions, wages, benefits or work rules provided by a collective bargaining 
agreement, when it is still in effect, if it is essential to the continuation ofthe debtor's 
business or is necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the estate. The 
implementation of interim changes does not, however, moot the procedures and 
requirements for an application for rejection. 
Active employees of an employer in liquidation. If an employer must 
shut down, it is likely to file under chapter 7. h this chapter, the court appoints a 
trustee who oversees the debtor's liquidation. The debtor's assets are reduced to cash 
and distributed among creditors. Although chapter 7 traditionally governs 
liquidation, a debtor may also liquidate its business under chapter 11. When a 
business closes, health and life insurance benefits are terminated because, unlike 
pensions, they are not pre-funded. Pension assets, for the reasons discussed below, 
are generally held in trust for the employee and are not available to the debtor's 
creditors. 
A common scenario in bankruptcy involves an employer who, at the time of 
filing, is in arrears in the payment of wages or contributions to employee benefit 
plans that require continuous funding. Employees who have a contractual claim to 
payment are considered "unsecured" creditors. 
The Code establishes priorities for the payment of unsecured  claim^.^ With the 
exception of administrative expenses, discussed above, priority claims generally 
cover prepetition debts. Because priority unsecured claims are paid before 
nonpriority claims there is a much greater chance for a creditor to realize payment for 
those having priority status. As amended by the BAPCPA, fourth priority is 
designated for unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions, but only to the 
extent of $10,000 for each individual, including vacation, severance and sick leave 
pay earned by an individual or corporation within 180 days before the date of filing 
or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs first; or, for 
sales commissions earned by an individual or by a corporation with only one 
employee acting as an independent contractor in the sale of goods or services for the 
debtor.' 
Fifth priority is similar to the fourth but governs unsecured claims for 
contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered within 180 
days before the filing or cessation of the debtor's business, but only to the extent of 
the number of employees covered by each such plan multiplied by $10,000 less (1) 
the aggregate amount paid to such employees under the fourth priority and (2) the 
aggregate amount paid by the estate on behalf of such employees to any other 
employee benefit plan. Hence, the fourth and fifth employee priorities together have 
an aggregated cap of $10,000 per employee. Creditors covered by this priority may 
11 U.S.C. 5 507. 
' This amount will be adjusted at three-year intervals to reflect changes to the Consumer 
Price Index. 11 U.S.C. 5 104. 
include, in addition to the employees themselves, entities that administer employee 
benefits, such as health or worker's compensation insurers.' 
Severance benefits. The bankruptcy priority for prepetition employee wages 
and benefits, including severance pay, is an important benchmark. In a liquidation 
scenario, it means that each employee with a claim in this category will be near the 
head of the line for distribution of the priority amount. Nonpriority unsecured claims 
will be distributed pro rata among unsecured creditors, including employees. 
The priority is significant in a reorganization as well. The priority amount must 
be paid through the reorganization plan in order for it to be confirmed by the court. 
As noted above, the priority is conferred on claims accruing prior to the bankruptcy 
filing. Severance earned postpetition, however, may qualify for an administrative 
expense priority.9 Claims for severance, particularly those asserting priority as 
postpetition administrative expenses, will be evaluated according to several factors 
and decided under the law of the federal circuit. The court will consider the terms 
of the agreement establishing severance, including whether it is payable in a lump 
sum or is based on length of service, and when it was agreed to. A determination of 
when the benefit accrues - pre- or postpetition - is not always readily apparent and 
rules governing it may also vary among the circuits. 
Prior to the BAPCPA, the priority amount for prepetition employee benefits, 
including severance, was capped at $4,925 earned within 90 days of the bankruptcy 
filing. Nevertheless, at least one court took advantage of the flexibility inherent in 
the bankruptcy process to enlarge the amount allocated to employee severance pay. 
Invoking the court's equitable authority," the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York permitted an increased allowance for prepetition 
employee severance payments in both the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies. The 
Enron decision implemented a settlement of litigation brought by former employees 
of Enron." The court also allowed creditor committees to bring avoidance actions 
to recover certain prepetition lump sum payments made to selected employees 
labeled as "90-day retention bonuses" to help fund the severance claims. Parties 
8 See In re J.G. Furniture Group, Incorp., 405 F.3d 191 (41h Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Ivey 
v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 2005 WL 24 1423 1 (Oct. 3,2005); Howard Delivery 
Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 403 F.3d 228 (41h Cir. 2005). 
See In re AcoustiSeal, Inc., 290 B.R. 354 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 2003)(employees that debtor 
had terminated postpetition would be allowed administrative priority for the pro rata share 
of severance pay actually earned postpetition; and severance pay claims asserted by 
nonexecutive employees were in part prepetition claims entitled to priority to the extent that 
they were earned within 90 days of filing, and in part postpetition claims entitled to priority 
as administrative expenses to the extent they accrued postpetition.) 
l o  11 U.S.C. 105. 
l 1  In re Enron Corp., Case Nos. 01-16034, Order of Final Approval, under I 1  U.S.C. §§ 
1 O5(a), 363(b), 11 03 (cj (5) and 11 O!J(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, Approving Settlement 
of Severance Claims of Similarly-Situated Claimants and Authorizing the Official 
Employment-RelatedIssues Committee to Commence Certain Avoidance Actions on Behalf 
of Estates, Aug. 28,2002 at [http:l/www.elaw4enron.comidefault.asp]. 
agreeing to the settlement received a maximum allowance of $13,500 per employee. 
In the WorldCom bankruptcy, the debtor requested - and the court granted - 
permission to pay prepetition severance pay due to terminated employees over the 
amount set by statute.12 The debtor justified its request by asserting that adverse 
publicity from the terminated employees could negatively impact WorldCom's 
relationship with its current employees. The payments were necessary to restore the 
confidence of current employees, whose cooperation and loyalty were essential to the 
reorganization effort. 
Pension benefits. Federal law does not require an employer to provide 
health insurance or pensions to employees. Although the tax laws are designed to 
encourage employers to provide these benefits, they may be altered or terminated 
within or outside of bankruptcy. 
The creation and administration of private sector pension plans are governed 
exclusively by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).'~ In 1974, 
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the interests of private sector participants and 
beneficiaries in a wide variety of employee welfare benefit and pension plans. A 
prime underlying policy of the act, articulated by the Supreme Court, is the 
congressional guarantee that "'if a worker has been promised a defined pension 
benefit upon retirement - and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to 
obtain a vested benefit - he will actually receive it.'"I4 Because of ERISA's 
comprehensive regulatory scheme, pension benefits are the least likely of employee 
benefits to be affected by bankruptcy, although they may be diminished or reduced 
in several situations. Thus, employees in many of the defined benefit "legacy" 
industries, such as steel, airlines, and, more recently, automobile parts 
manufacturers, have experienced substantial reductions in their pensions as a result 
of bankruptcy-related distress terminations. 
There are a wide variety of tax-qualified employee pension programs. Among 
the most common are defined contribution and defined benefit plans. In the former, 
l 2  In re WorldCom, Inc., Case Nos. 02-13533, Order Authorizing the Payment ofSeverance 
Benejts and Related Obligations to Terminated Employees and Rejection of Certain 
Severance Agreements, Oct. 1,2002 at [http://www.elaw4enron.comNorldComdefault.asp]. 
l3  29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Pension benefit plans generally fall into one of two broad 
categories, namely, defined contribution plans or defined benefit plans. The former is aplan 
in which contributions are fixed, but not benefits, e.g., a fixed amount or percentage of 
compensation is invested in the plan and comprises the basis for accruing plan benefits. The 
latter, a defined benefit plan, is a pension plan that specifies the benefits or method of 
determining the benefits, but not the contribution. The sponsor of the defined benefit plan 
bears the risk of investment performance and must compensate for any discrepancies 
between the amounts invested and the amounts promised to be paid as benefits. ERISA 
regulates private sector defined benefit and defined contribution plans. See CRS Report 
95-926 EPW, Regulating Private Pensions: A Brief Summary of ERISA, by Patrick 
Purcell. 
'"onnolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 21 l ,2  14 (1986), quoting Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,720 (1984). 
which includes 401(k) plans, the employee, and perhaps the employer, makes 
contributions to the retirement account on behalf of the employee. The fund, though 
managed by an employer in accordance with requirements of ERISA and the U.S. 
Tax Code, is property of the employee. In the event of the employer's bankruptcy, 
defined contribution trust funds are not assets available to the debtor's creditors. 
Under a defined benefit plan, an employee is promised a set payment, typically one 
based upon salary and years of service. According to the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC), there is a significant trend away from traditional defined 
benefit plans, discussed below, to new "hybrid" pension plans, such as cash balance 
plans, which are a form of defined benefit plan insured by the PBGC." 
Defined benefit pension plans may be terminated voluntarily by an employer or 
involuntarily by the PBGC. An employer may terminate a plan voluntarily in one of 
two ways. It may proceed with a standard termination only if it has sufficient assets 
to pay all benefit commitments. A standard termination does not, therefore, 
implicate PBGC insurance responsibilities. 
If an employer wishes to terminate a plan whose assets are insufficient to pay 
all benefits, the employer must demonstrate that it is in financial distress as defined 
by ERISA. The concern connected with a distress termination is the adequacy of the 
plan's funding. That is, is there enough money to support payment of the pension 
commitment? This is where the PBGC7s pension insurance program, which is 
funded by employer paid premiums, is implicated.16 If an under-funded corporate 
pension plan is terminated, the PBGC insurance program guarantees some payment 
to covered employees. The PBGC then seeks recovery of the deficiency from the 
employer, asserting a lien therefor, if necessary. Although the PBGC guaranty 
program is designed to minimize the impact of corporate bankruptcy on the debtor's 
retirees, when an under-funded pension plan is terminated, the PBGC imposes a 
statutory ceiling on guaranteed payments. Thus, beneficiaries of an under-funded 
terminated plan may receive payments that are substantially less than promised. 
Neither a standard nor a distress termination by the employer is permitted if 
termination would violate the terms of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. 
But negotiations in bankruptcy are influenced by the prospect ofthe debtor's possible 
liquidation. The PBGC may, nonetheless, terminate a plan involuntarily, 
notwithstanding the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement. Likewise, 
termination can be undone and restoration ordered by PBGC. When a plan is 
restored, full benefits are reinstated and the employer, rather than the PBGC, is again 
responsible for the plan's unfunded liabilities. 
l 5  PBGC, A Predictable, Secure Pension For Life: Dejined Benefit Plans 6 at 
[http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/defined~benefit_pens.htm]. See CRS Report RL30 196, 
Pension Issues: Cash-Balance Plans, by Patrick Purcell. 
l 6  Under ERISA pension regulation, participation, vesting, and funding standards are 
administered by the Internal Revenue Service; fiduciary standards and reporting and 
disclosure requirements are regulated by the Department of Labor; benefit insurance 
provisions are regulated by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 
The largest pension default in U.S. history occurred with the termination - and 
transfer to the PBGC - of four defined benefit plans administered by United 
~irlines." Over the strenuous objection of its union employees, United Airlines, in 
reorganization under chapter 11 of the Code, entered into negotiations with the 
PBGC, which agreed to assume them, invoking its involuntary termination authority. 
The plans, covering pilots, ground employees, flight attendants, and others, were 
collectively underfimded by $9.8 billion, of which $6.6 billion is guaranteed. The 
courts have, to date, upheld the plans' termination and transfer to the PBGC despite 
challenges by the Union of Flight Attendants.18 
Retiree benefits. Pensions. As discussed above, retiree pension benefits are 
held in trust for the retiree and are regulated by ERISA. 
Health and Life Insurance Benefits. Many employers reserve a right to modify 
or terminate employee welfare benefit plans and do so outside of bankr~ptcy. '~ 
Courts reviewing plan alteration or termination generally base their decisions on the 
specific terms of a plan's documents or associated collective bargaining agreement. 
In bankruptcy, the status of retiree life and health insurance benefits is largely 
determined by the nature of the action - chapter 1 1 reorganization versus liquidation 
under chapter 7 or chapter 11. 
The reorganization of the LTV Corp. proved to be a prime force behind 
clarification of the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of retirees' health and life insurance 
benefits during reorganization. On the same day it filed in bankruptcy in 1986, LTV 
Corp. notified more than 66,000 retirees of its intention to terminate health and life 
insurance coverage under the company's employee benefit plan. Acting swiftly to 
express its disapproval of LTV's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code's 
requirements, Congress enacted legislation blocking LTV's cessation of insurance 
payments on the retirees behalf." Then, in 1988, Congress amended the Code by 
adding new 11 U.S.C. 5 11 14 entitled "Payment of insurance benefits to retired 
employees." The procedures for a debtor's termination of retiree insurance benefits 
are modeled after those for termination of collective-bargaining agreements in 
chapter 1 1. 
In summary, 5 11 14 provides that a debtor in reorganization may not terminate 
health and life insurance payment programs maintained for retirees and their spouses 
l7 Judge Affirms Pension Default Pact Between United Airlines and PBGC, 17 BNA BANKR. 
L. J. 659 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois affirms decision of 
bankruptcy court).( July 28, 2005). 
See Assoc. of Flight Attendants-CWA v. PBGC, 372 F. Supp.2d 91 (D.D.C. 2005); In re 
UAL Corp., 2005 WL 1154264 (Bankr.N.D.111. 2005), aff'd, F . 3 d  , 2005 WL 
2848938 (7th Cir., Nov. 1, 2005). 
l 9  See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Can the Retiree Health Benejits Provided By Your Employer Be 
Cut?, at [http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/pubs/briefl .htm]. For general background, 
see CRS Report RL32944, Health Insurance Coverage for Retirees by Hinda Ripps 
Chailund and Fran Larkins. 
2 0 ~ . ~ .  99-591, # 608 (1986); P.L. 99-656 (1986); P.L. 100-41 (1987). 
and dependents withoutfirst negotiatingproposed modifications in benefit payments 
with representatives of the retirees, and second, seeking and receiving court approval 
to make the modifications. If the debtor and the retirees cannot agree upon 
modifications, and the debtor believes them to be necessary to permit reorganization, 
the court may permit modifications, subject to statutory guidelines. The debtor must 
have negotiated with the representative of the retirees in good faith, and the court, 
after a hearing in which all parties have had an opportunity to be heard, must find that 
the proposed modification is necessary to permit the reorganization ofthe debtor and 
assures that all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated fairly 
and equitably. Thus, in the course of a chapter 1 1 reorganization in which the debtor 
continues to operate the business, it must continue to pay retiree health and life 
insurance benefits unless it has negotiated necessary modifications - or termination 
of payments - with the representatives of the affected group, or has received the 
bankruptcy court's permission to do so. Payments made are accorded high priority 
"administrative expense" status. 
The BAPCPA amended § 1 1 14 to add a "look back" provision for eve-of-filing 
modification of retiree insurance benefits. If the debtor, while insolvent, modifies 
retiree benefits within 180 days of filing, the court may reinstate the benefits unless 
the balance of equities supports m~dification.~' 
If a corporate debtor's reorganization is unsuccessful, it may liquidate. In a 
liquidation, the retirees' claims for lost insurance benefits would be unsecured 
claims. The fourth and fifth priorities for employee benefits apply only to payments 
on behalf ofpresent employees, not retirees. When Congress passed 5 1 1 14 ensuring 
the continuation of payments of retiree health and life insurance benefits throughout 
a reorganization if the debtor could afford to pay them, it did not appear to address 
the status of these claims in liquidation. Nor did it amend 3 507 of the Code, which 
creates high priority unsecured claims. Obviously, when a company ceases 
operation, it cannot continue to incur business-related operating expenses. Retirees 
with insurance claims would be unsecured creditors of the debtor, and any amount 
they might recover would depend upon the nature and amount of claims outstanding 
relative to the h d s  available to satisfy them.22 
COBRA continuation coverage. Under the provisions of Title X of the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),23 as amended, 
employers are required to permit employees or family members to continue their 
group health insurance coverage at their own expense, but at group rates, if they lose 
coverage because of designated work or family-related events.24 Among the 
2' 11 U.S.C. 5 11 14(1). 
22 At least one court has held that 3 11 14 does not apply if the case is converted to chapter 
7. Retiree benefit payments have administrative expense status only while a debtor operates 
under chapter 11. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 515 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
23 P.L. 99-272 (April 7, 1986). 
24 See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Health Benefits Under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, COBRA at 
(continued. ..) 
"qualifying events" which trigger COBRA'S continuation coverage is an employer's 
filing a case under the Bankruptcy Code (on or after July 1, 1986) with respect to a 
covered employee who has retired.25 "To lose coverage" for COBRA purposes 
includes a substantial elimination of coverage that occurs within twelve months 
before or after the date on which the bankruptcy proceeding begins.26 
In general, a "covered employee" is an individual who is provided coverage by 
virtue of employment (or previous employment) with the employer. Hence, the 
definition includes retirees who receive health coverage in addition to their pension. 
In the case of a retiree of a bankrupt employer, the continuation coverage must be 
available until the death of the covered employee or the qualified beneficiary. In this 
situation, a "qualified beneficiary" includes a covered employee who has retired on 
or before the date on which coverage was eliminated, and any other individual who, 
on the day before the bankruptcy proceedings, was a beneficiary under the plan, 
either as the spouse, dependent child, or surviving spouse of the covered employee. 
For the surviving spouse or dependent children of the covered employee, the period 
of coverage is limited to 36 months after the death of the covered employee. 
Although COBRAprovides retirees' lifetime coverage, it is contingent upon the 
employer's maintaining the plan for current employees. Continuation coverage for 
all qualified beneficiaries terminates on the date when the employer ceases to provide 
any group health plan to any employee, i.e., when the plan ends. 
COBRA may be a useful safety net if an employer in bankruptcy terminates a 
retiree health plan but continues to offer health benefits to current employees. In that 
event, retirees would be entitled to continuation coverage under the employer's 
ongoing plan. But COBRA works in conjunction with ERISA and the Bankruptcy 
Code; it does not require an employer to fund independent health insurance for 
retirees or to maintain the plan on behalf of current employees notwithstanding other 
permissible termination provisions of ERISA or the Code. 
Employee Participation in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Employee representation on creditor committees. Viewed broadly, 
a chapter 1 I reorganization contemplates a negotiated settlement of claims by the 
debtor with its creditors under the supervision of the court and within the strictures 
of the Code. Creditors actively participate in the development of a reorganization 
plan, and ultimately vote to accept or reject it. Employees may have a limited voice 
or a more active role in reorganization negotiations. 
Rules of bankruptcy practice expressly grant a labor union, an employees' 
association, or a representative of employees a right to address the court "to be heard 
24 (...continued) 
[http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/pubs/COBRA/cobra99.pdfJ and CRS Report 
E30626, Health Insurance Continuation Coverage under COBRA, by Heidi Yacker. 
25 29 U.S.C. 5 1163. 
'6  64 Federal Register 5165 (Feb. 3, 1999). 
on the economic soundness of a plan affecting employees'  interest^."^' The right is 
limited, however, because the employee representative does not generally have 
standing to appeal any of the bankruptcy court's rulings. 
A more active role in the reorganization planning is reserved to creditor 
committees. Shortly after the bankruptcy petition is filed, the U.S. trustee will 
appoint an official committee of creditors holding unsecured claims.28 In complex 
cases, the court may create additional committees if necessary to ensure adequate 
representation of creditors. The unsecured creditors' committee is generally 
comprised of persons willing to serve who hold the seven largest claims of the types 
represented by the committee. Among the committee's powers and duties is the 
authority: 
a to consult with the trustee or debtor concerning the administration 
of the case; 
a to investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial 
condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and 
the desirability of the continuing it; 
a to participate in the formulation of a plan, to advise those 
represented by the committee of any committee determinations 
andlor any plan formulated; and 
a to generally represent the interests of creditors who are re~resen ted .~~ 
Every bankruptcy is intensely fact-specific with specific creditor claims 
dictating the composition of the creditor committee(s). When employees are 
unsecured creditors, they may be represented on creditor  committee^.^^ If and when 
appropriate, the court may allow the creation of official or unofficial committees 
composed solely of employee representatives. For example, in the Enron bankruptcy, 
the court appointed a committee "for the purpose of investigating the issues relating 
to: (1) the continuation of health or other benefits for former employees of the 
Debtors; (2) the investigation of claims uniquely held by employees, as such, against 
the Debtors; (3) the treatment of employees' claims under any plan(s) of 
reorganization or liquidation; (4) possible Warn Act violations by the Debtors in 
discharging employees; (5) possible violation by the Debtors of state labor laws and 
certain provisions of ERISA; and (6) dissemination of non-confidential information 
27 Fed. Rules of Bankr. Procedure, Rule 2018. 
11 U.S.C. 9 1102. 
29 11 U.S.C. § 1103. 
30 See, e.g., In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88 (31d Cir. 1984)(Pilots' association, which 
was the exclusive bargaining agent for pilots holding claims for unpaid wages which 
amounted to the second largest unsecured claim against the debtor, was entitled to 
appointment to the unsecured creditors' committee.); In re Salant Corp., 53 B.R. 158 
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1985)(When the creditor committee was made up of seventeen members, 
including one representative of managerial employees, the court was willing to grant a 
union's motion to add an additional three members to represent non-managerial employees.) 
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relating to items (1) through (5) hereof to  employee^[.]"^' Unofficial committees 
comprised of self-selected members may be free of the fiduciary responsibilities 
required of an official committee. 
Section 11 14 expressly provides for the appointment of committees of retired 
employees when a debtor seeks to modify or terminate retiree benefits. The U.S. 
Trustee appoints members to act as "authorized representatives" for retirees. 
Ordinarily, retirees whose benefits are covered by collective bargaining agreements 
are represented by the labor organization. Recognizing that there can be internal 
conflicts between the interests of active employees and retirees covered by a CBA 
and their interests in the bankruptcy case, the labor organization may elect not to 
serve as authorized representative. In that case, a committee may be comprised of 
other retirees found by the court to be appropriate. 
Employee litigation-based claims against an employer. The 
bankruptcies of Enron and other companies, such as Polaroid, Global Crossing, and 
WorldCom, raised new concerns about corporate responsibility for harm employees 
experience as a result of illegal stock manipulation and other forms of corporate 
malfeasance. For example, employees' defined contribution pension finds, when 
comprised of their employer's stock, can be devastated by employer 
mismanagement. Discussed below is the process a bankruptcy court may use to 
consider a civil claim for damages that has not been reduced to judgment prior to the 
bankruptcy filing. 
History teaches that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is not an efficient vehicle to 
protect the fimding and management of employment benefits.32 By the time an 
employer is in bankruptcy, if the system has already failed, it is generally too late to 
impose new management, auditing, fiduciary, or funding safeguards to restore 
benefits. Other laws, such as ERISA, the Tax Code, and COBRA, address these 
employment benefit programs prospectively. Nevertheless, employees who are 
victims of wrongdoing may wonder if they can assert those claims in the bankruptcy 
and increase their distributive share of the debtor's assets. 
It is frequently said that a debtor in bankruptcy "cannot be sued." While it is 
correct that bankruptcy's automatic stay stops the continuation of a judicial process 
to collect a money judgment,33 it does not mean that a debtor corporation is immune 
from claims that have not yet been reduced to judgment. If employees want to sue 
31 In re Enron, Amended Appointment of Employment-Related Issues Committee, 
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2002), at 2002 Extra LEXIS 537. 
32 After the LTV Corp. filed under chapter 1 1 in 1986, the debtor and the PBGC engaged 
in a great deal of litigation concerning payment of arrearages as a result of undefinding of 
the debtor's pension plans. Although the PBGC was initially unsuccessful in asserting 
administrative and unsecured priority claims for underfunding arrearages, it ultimately 
succeeded in ordering restoration of the terminated plans. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 1 15 
B.R. 760 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1990), order vacatedandwithdrawn, 17 Employee Benefits Cas. 
1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990). 
33 11 U.S.C. 9 362. 
their employerldebtor, they may still have a "claim" in bankruptcy, even if it has not 
been reduced to j~dgment.~'  
When a claim that must be established through a lawsuit is stayed, the 
bankruptcy court is permitted to estimate "any contingent or unliquidated claim, the 
fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the 
administration of the case[.]"35 The court may also estimate any right to payment 
"arising from a right to an equitable remedy for breach of perf~rmance."~~ This 
occurs pursuant to the bankruptcy court's mandate to allow or disallow claims 
against the estate. Estimating claims for the purpose of confirming a plan under 
chapter 11 is expressly cited as a core proceeding within a bankruptcy court's 
j~risdiction.~' 
Hence, the chapter 1 1 filing triggers a series of decisions by the court evaluating 
the stayed litigation. Do the best interests of the parties and the bankruptcy estate 
require the estimation of outstanding claims or should they be reduced to a sum 
certain, i.e., fixed by litigation authorized by the court? Agreeing on appropriate 
methodology to estimate a claim is in itself a complicated issue. 
The courts have discretion to consider the most appropriate manner to handle 
an unliquidated, contingent claim - whether it should be estimated or whether the 
stay should be lifted. The goal of the bankruptcy process is to fix an amount, i.e., 
assign a value for a claim in order to expedite reorganization; to determine whether 
reorganization itself is feasible; and, to assist the parties in fashioning a plan. It is 
also necessary to create a yardstick to enable the court to apply the "best interests of 
the creditor" test for a chapter 1 I debtor. The court cannot confirm a chapter I I 
reorganization plan unless creditors will receive more under the plan than if the 
debtor were liq~idated.~' 
And, of course, creditors are constrained by practical strategic considerations. 
Litigation is an expensive proposition and it may not be worthwhile in the face of a 
looming prospect of the debtor's having inadequate assets to satisfy the claim. 
Simply put, does the potential distribution warrant the costs of litigation? Some 
34 A "claim" in bankruptcy is defined broadly at 11 U.S.C. tj  101(5) to mean "(A) right to 
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced 
to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or 
unsecured." 
35 11 U.S.C. tj  502(c)(l). See In the Matter of Interco Incorp., 137 B.R. 993 (Bankr.E.D. 
Mo. 1992)(Claims of a multiemployer pension fund against a debtor may be estimated). 
36 Id. 
j7 28 U.S.C. 9 157(b)(2)(B). A bankruptcy court may not, however, liquidate or estimate 
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims. 
'V 1 U.S.C. 5 1129(a)(7). 
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portion or all of the creditors' damages may be discharged in the bankruptcy and any 
recovery will be reduced by distributions among all unsecured creditors. 
Employees whose pensions have suffered under the fiduciary mismanagement 
of corporate debtors face many difficult decisions. Claims against their employers 
may be based on many legal theories grounded in many different laws. Claims may 
be directed at different parties within and without bankruptcy and this may also 
affect decisions regarding litigation. The bankruptcy process, however, does allow 
claims that have not been finalized to be considered. And, as in all bankruptcies, the 
outcome is dependent upon the unique situation of each debtor and its creditors. 
The Enron bankruptcy is a case study. Numerous suits have been filed against 
the debtor by or on behalf of employees, and although few went to trial, several 
settlements have been announced. In December of 2001, a federal district court 
consolidated all of the ERISA claims brought in the Southern District of Texas under 
the caption, Tittle v. Enron ~ o r p . ~ ~  In June of 2005, the court approved a proposed 
settlement between former Enron employees and insurers for numerous pension plan 
fiduciaries that would give a judgment reduction credit of $85 million, representing 
the policy limits on two fiduciary liability policies.40 Basically, in return for releasing 
defendants from further claims for indemnity or contribution arising from ERISA- 
based claims, the plaintiffs will collect insurance proceeds. The district court judge 
is quoted as explaining: 
Without question this settlement is driven by the need to preserve for the plaintiff 
class the insurance policy proceeds, which otherwise are likely to be consumed 
by litigation defense costs. This factor works to justify a settlement for less than 
what Plaintiffs might obtain if they continued to prosecute their claims through 
trial, only to find that the actual recovery has gone up in smoke[.I4l 
In another proceeding, the U.S. Dept. of Labor announced an agreement that would 
give participants in an Enron retirement plan a general unsecured bankruptcy claim 
of $356.25 million.42 The announcement notes that the final distribution that plan 
participants receive will depend upon the total amount of assets available. Earlier in 
the bankruptcy, the PBGC announced an agreement it reached with Enron requiring 
it to place $32 1 million in escrow to fund a standard termination ofits defined benefit 
pension plan.43 
39 For background on the litigation, see CRS Report RL3 1282, Tittle v. Enron Corp. and 
Fiduciary Duties under ERISA by Jon Shimabukuro. 
40 Court Approves Partial Settlement in Enron Fiduciary Breach Litigation, 17 BNA 
BANKR. L. REPTR. 488 (June 2,2005). 
41 Id. 
42 Labor Department Announces Agreement Giving Enron Participants Unsecured Claim, 
17 BNA BANKR. L. REPTR. 61 1 (July 14,2005). 
43 Enron Agrees to Pay $321 Million To Preserve Plans 'Defined Benefits, 16 BNA BANKR. 
L. REPTR. 8 17 (Sept. 16,2004). 
A major bankruptcy may involve a great deal of litigation, much of which is 
designed to assess andlor settle claims both against and on behalf of the debtor. Just 
discussed are examples of employee and federal agency claims against Enron. 
Likewise, suits brought by Enron against others have been settled.44 Claims settled 
in Enron's favor bring assets into the bankruptcy estate for ultimate distribution to 
creditors. Thus, the bankruptcy process does, to some extent, encompass procedures 
for addressing debtor wrongdoing. There are strong incentives for creditors and the 
debtor to attempt to evaluate and settle civil claims in order to reorganize. 
Managerial Compensation in Bankruptcy 
The substantial amounts that many attorneys and professionals earn as fees for 
work performed in a major bankruptcy case has been, and continues for many to be 
a subject of widespread interest. So too, more recently, has the amount of executive 
compensation earned by debtor's management on the eve of or in the course of the 
bankruptcy. In many cases, debtor companies retain "turn around" experts or bring 
in new executives to guide the company through the restructuring and bankruptcy 
process. Executive compensation, like other employee benefits, comes in many 
forms and is contract specific. Although a trustee is always appointed in chapter 7, 
chapter 11 is premised on the supposition that a reorganization is most likely to be 
successful and creditors and the public are most likely to benefit from continued 
operation of the business by existing management.45 Under chapter 1 1, management 
may be removed "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
mismanagement 
In the ordinary course of a bankruptcy, certain claims are "disallowed. This 
means that even though a creditor may have a perfectly legal claim, bankruptcy law 
declines to permit, or allow it - generally for the purpose of maximizing the debtor's 
estate for distribution to all creditors. One example of such are claims by an 
employee whose employment contract is terminated for damages that exceed more 
than one year's compensation under the ~ontract.~" 
Like all bankruptcy claims, the disposition of executive compensation may 
depend upon when it was earned andlor paid, that is, before or after the bankruptcy 
filing. Postpetition payments are generally subject to court approval, and prepetition 
payments, to a more limited extent, may be subject to avoidance. Generally, the 
44 See JPMorgan Chase Settles With Enron; Will Pay $350 Million in Bankruptcy Case, 17 
BNA BANKR. L. REPTR. 742 (August 25,2005). 
45 H.Rept. 95-595, 9Sh Cong., 1" Sess. 233 (1977), comprisingpart of the legislative history 
of the 1978 bankruptcy law. "Moreover, the need for reorganization of a public company 
today often results from simple business reverses, not from any fraud, dishonesty, or gross 
mismanagement of the part of the debtor's management." 
46 11 U.S.C. 5 1104. Pursuant to amendment by the BAPCPA, the U.S. Trustee shall seek 
appointment of a trustee if "there are reasonable grounds to suspect that current members 
of the governing body of the debtor ...p articipated in fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct 
in the management of the debtor or the debtor's public financial reporting." 5 11 04(e). 
" 11 U.S.C. 5 502(b)(7). 
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debtor must assume the employment contract, that is reaffirm it after the bankruptcy 
filing, in order for an executive to lay claim to payments thereunder as an 
administrative priority.48 
Nevertheless, retention bonuses and similar compensation for executives are 
commonly sought and approved by the courts.49 But they may be challenged by 
parties to the bankruptcy proceeding and denied in whole or part. In a pre-BAPCPA 
decision in the U.S. Airways bankruptcy, the court considered proposed severance 
and retention plans for its officer and non-officer managerial employees.50 The 
proposed plan, called a Key Employee Retention Plan or KERP, affected executives 
and over 1,800 management employees and was formulated in contemplation o f  a 
merger of the debtor with another airline. The motion to approve the plan was 
supported by the Official Committee of  Unsecured Creditors, which had negotiated 
a number of  changes to the original proposal, and was opposed by the U.S. Trustee 
and by the unions representing the debtor's pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, and 
reservation agents. Explaining its rationale, the court observed: 
The Bankruptcy Code does not specifically address so-called Key Employee 
Retention Plans, or KERPs, whether adopted before the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition or after. It is common, however, for bankruptcy courts to approve the 
adoption ofpost-petition KERF'S, or the assumption ofpre-petition KERPs, ifthe 
debtor has used "proper business judgment" in adopting the plan, and the plan 
is "fair and reasonable." In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80 
(Bankr.D.Mass.2001). Nevertheless KERPs have something of a shady 
reputation. All too often they have been used to lavishly reward- at the expense 
of the creditor body- the very executives whose bad decisions or lack of 
foresight were responsible for the debtor's financial plight. But even where 
external circumstances rather than the executives are to blame, there is something 
inherently unseemly in the effort to insulate the executives from the financial 
risks all other stakeholders face in the bankruptcy process. Congressional 
concern over KERP excesses is clearly reflected in changes to the Bankruptcy 
Code that will become effective for cases filed after October 17, 2005. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, Pub.L. No. 
lO9-8,g 33 1, 1 19 Stat. 23,102-03 (April 20,2005). Those changes will severely 
48 See, e.g., In re FBI Distribution Corp., 330 F.3d 36 (1" Cir. 2003)(Executive who was 
terminated by chapter 11 debtor after rendering postpetition services was not entitled to 
administrative priority claim for employment and retention benefits under prepetition 
employment agreement that was rejected by the debtor. The executive was entitled to the 
reasonable value of her postpetition services that benefitted the estate.). 
49 See, e.g., In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 2001 WL 34133840 (Bankr.N.D.Ca. 
2001)(Court approves management retention program supported by Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors over objections of U.S. Trustee.); In re American West Airlines, Inc., 
171 B.R. 674 (Bankr.D. Ariz. 1994)(Court approves "success" bonus for chief executive 
officer and others who successfully downsized airline and settled substantial administrative 
claims despite seven hundred letters to the court from rank and file employees objecting to 
management bonuses. The court found that the executives had accomplished a "major feat" 
and were essential to the reorganization process.); In re Interco Incorp., 128 B.R. 229 
(Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1991)(Court approves performance-based executive retention program to 
ensure that critical executives remained with debtors throughout reorganization.). 
In re U.S. Airways, 329 B.R. 793 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 2005). 
limit both the circumstances under which severance and retention payments may 
be made to insiders as well as the amount of such payments, which will be 
limited to 10 times the average amount of severance or retention payments for 
non-management employees during the same calendar year.5' 
In support of  their objections, the U.S. Trustee and the unions argued that the 
plan was overly broad and would undercut employee morale by sparing management 
from financial sacrifices that the unionized workforce had to bear. 
First, the court considered whether the debtor made a threshold showing that it 
used sound business judgment in adopting the plan. It concluded that "[tlhere can 
be little doubt, based on the evidence, that the plan is in response to a serious 
retention problem," because there were 340 unfilled open positions. The court 
ultimately approved a modified KERP that applied to management employees below 
the officer level upon approval, but deferred applicability to senior level officers until 
plan confirmation. 
Of the objections to the program, surely the most compelling, from a purely 
human point of view, is that it represents a betrayal of the principle of "shared 
sacrifice" that was championed by the company in the litigation and negotiations 
that resulted in over $900 million of wage and other concessions by its unionized 
workforce. While management employees took some pay cuts and benefit 
reductions, the plain truth is that those cuts were significantly less than the cuts 
experienced by the non-management employees. It is hardly any wonder, 
therefore, that the rank and file employees have reacted to the proposal with 
considerable outrage, as evidenced, for example, by the petition that was 
admitted at the hearing signed by 2,209 members of the Communications 
Workers of America denouncing the proposed severance plan and urging this 
court not to approve it. 
The court is certainly sensitive to what one witness described as the "uproar in 
the workplace" after the company announced it would seek approval of the 
severance plan. At the same time, the court cannot ignore the fact that the 
landscape has significantly changed. At the time the labor concessions were 
negotiated, the company was headed along a particular path, that of 
transformation. Now it is headed on a different path, that of merger. Under a 
transformation plan, employees--whether management or rank and file--were 
equally likely to keep their jobs (if the company successfully emerged from 
chapter 1 1 as a viable airline) or to lose them (if the company had to liquidate). 
Under the proposed merger, by contrast, few of the unionized employees are 
likely to face the loss of their jobs, since there is little overlap in the route 
structure of the two airlines. However, somewhere between one-third and 
one-half ofthe management employees are expected ultimately to lose theirjobs. 
The problem the company faces is that those management employees will be 
needed up until the day their employment is terminated, perhaps two years from 
now. If they leave too soon, the merger itself (and with it, the jobs of the rank 
and file employees) will be threatened. 
The argument that the program is too broad and that any retention benefits 
should be narrowly targeted to "critical" or "key" employees likewise misses the 
5' Id. at 797-798. 
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mark. The evidence at the hearing convincingly established that the headquarters 
organization cannot afford further attrition without effectively eliminating its 
ability to carry the company through the merger. Put another way, once a football 
team has been reduced to 11 pla ers, every one of them is "critical," since you 
cannot field a team with fewer. 5 7  
Although postpetition retention and severance payments are substantially 
modified by the BAPCPA, the foregoing illustrates how a bankruptcy court attempts 
to balance economic and non-economic competing interests and claims in the 
reorganization process. 
The court has less control over prepetition payments, although they can be 
avoided in some circumstances, such as when they are found to be fraudulent, as 
discussed above in the Enron bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there is an inherent tension 
in the policy decision to allow existing management to steer a prospective debtor 
through reorganization when self-policing is also an issue. The implicit conflict of 
interest that can arise between a chapter 11 debtor company, its management and its 
creditors is acknowledged by the courts. A U.S. Court of Appeals considered 
whether a bankruptcy court can authorize a creditors' committee to sue derivatively 
on behalf of the trustee to recover alleged fraudulent conveyances made by 
management.53 It concluded that a court-approved derivative suit for the benefit of 
the debtor's estate was permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. 
As a component of its analysis, the court observed that avoiding a fraudulent 
conveyance could be a particularly "vexing" problem in a chapter 11 context: 
This situation immediately gives rise to the proverbial problem of the fox 
guarding the henhouse. If no trustee is appointed, the debtor--really, the debtor's 
management--bears a fiduciary duty to avoid fraudulent transfers that it itself 
made. One suspects that if managers can devise any opportunity to avoid 
bringing a claim that would amount to reputational self-immolation, they will 
seize it. For that reason, courts and commentators have acknowledged that the 
debtor-in-possession "often acts under the influence of conflicts of interest." 
These conflicts of interest can arise even in situations where there is no concern 
that a debtor's management is trying to save its own skm. For example, a debtor 
may be unwilling to pursue claims against individuals or businesses, such as 
critical suppliers, with whom it has an ongoing relationship that it fears 
damaging. Finally, even if a bankrupt debtor is willing to bring an avoidance 
action, it might be too financially weakened to advocate vigorously for itself. In 
any of these situations, the real losers are the unsecured creditors whose interests 
avoidance actions are designed to protect.54 
In conclusion, although the Bankruptcy Code presumes that a debtor company's 
management is best qualified to lead the debtor through the reorganization process, 
there are equitable and statutory mechanisms to address intentional wrongdoing and 
53 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 
548 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1001, 1002 (2003). 
j4 Id. at 573. (Citations omitted). 
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less damaging departures from sound business judgment. And, while there is 
substantial flexibility in the reorganization process and employees are provided some 
level of protection, there is no question that the reorganization process is used 
strategically by business debtors to shed what are perceived to be onerous employee 
benefit programs. 
